Real countries, real policies, and what the numbers did afterwards — including where it went wrong.
Finland teaches this in school and refuses to make it a subject. The national core curriculum in force since 2016 makes multiliteracy one of seven transversal competences running across all 20 subjects, from early childhood care through to adult education. A pupil meets it in history, in maths and in art — not in a media literacy lesson on a Tuesday.
What happened. Finland has been at or near the top of the Media Literacy Index in every edition. In the 2026 index it is joint first with 71 points out of 100, alongside Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. In the Reuters Institute's 2026 survey, 63% of Finns said they trust most news most of the time, against 37% across 48 markets.
The catch. The index does not measure what its name suggests. Forty per cent of the score is press-freedom rankings, 40% is PISA test results, 10% is a survey question about trusting other people, and 5% each is university enrolment and a UN e-participation index. Not one component asks anybody to judge whether a claim is true. Finland scored highly on all those inputs before 2016 as well, and no study isolates what the curriculum itself did.
Finnish National Agency for Education, Multiliteracy and media literacy; Open Society Institute – Sofia, Media Literacy Index 2026
Facebook announced on 15 December 2016 that stories disputed by independent fact-checkers would carry a red warning flag. It removed the flag on 20 December 2017 and replaced it with a panel of related articles. The company's stated reason was that a strong image such as a red flag 'may actually entrench deeply held beliefs — the opposite effect to what we intended'.
What happened. Pennycook, Bear, Collins and Rand tested the design on 5,271 people and then on 1,568 more, publishing in Management Science on 21 February 2020. Flagged false headlines were rated accurate by 18.7% against 22.0% in the control, so the warning itself worked. But unflagged false headlines in the same feed rose to 22.9%. On sharing the gap was wider: 16.1% would share a flagged false headline, 29.8% in the control, and 36.2% an unflagged one sitting next to flagged ones.
The catch. This is the implied truth effect, and it is the clearest backfire on the page: labelling some falsehoods tells the reader the unlabelled ones passed inspection. Fact-checking capacity is always smaller than the feed, so partial labelling is the only kind that exists. The caveat on the caveat: these were online panels rating headlines in a list, not people scrolling their own feeds, and both studies were run in one country.
Pennycook, Bear, Collins and Rand, 'The Implied Truth Effect', Management Science, 21 February 2020
Researchers at Cambridge and Bristol, working with Google's Jigsaw unit, tried inoculation instead of correction: 90-second videos showing a manipulation technique — false dichotomy, scapegoating, incoherence — before anyone meets it in the wild. Six controlled experiments were followed by a field trial that bought the videos as ordinary YouTube advertising slots.
What happened. Across seven studies with roughly 30,000 participants, published in Science Advances in August 2022, the videos improved recognition of manipulation techniques. In the field, 5.4 million YouTube users saw one, about a million watched at least 30 seconds, and 22,632 answered a test question within 24 hours. The average improvement was 5 percentage points, bought at about $0.05 a view.
The catch. The follow-up is where this gets honest. Modirrousta-Galian and Higham reanalysed the gamified versions in 2023 with signal-detection methods and concluded the games mostly make people more sceptical of everything, true and false alike, rather than better at telling the two apart. In 2026 Seabrooke, Modirrousta-Galian and Higham ran the Bad News game with 150 Indian participants and Indian headlines and found no improvement in discrimination at all: t(149) = 0.49, p = .63. One null result with 150 people belongs next to seven studies with 30,000, not underneath them.
Roozenbeek and colleagues, Science Advances, August 2022; Seabrooke, Modirrousta-Galian and Higham, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 33:13, 2026
Singapore built the fastest correction mechanism of any country with elections. The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act was passed on 8 May 2019 and came into force on 2 October 2019. It lets a minister order a person or a platform to carry a correction notice beside a post, or to block access to it. The appeal goes to the courts — after the order has taken effect.
What happened. The government's own published tabulation records 82 cases and 172 directions up to 31 January 2025: 134 correction directions, 33 targeted correction directions and five general correction directions, plus four access-blocking orders and three access-disabling orders. Eight declaration notices covered 21 online locations.
The catch. Speed is the design and speed is the objection. The first decision is taken by a minister rather than a court, and the cost of contesting it falls afterwards on the person corrected. The act has been applied to opposition politicians and independent news sites, and Human Rights Watch called in March 2026 for it to be repealed. The government's published case is that falsehoods travel faster than any court can sit. Both of those statements are true at the same time, which is the whole difficulty.
POFMA Office, tabulation of POFMA cases and actions (to 31 January 2025)
After Brazil's 2018 election, in which chain messages were widely blamed, WhatsApp stopped trying to judge content — encrypted messages cannot be read — and started limiting how fast anything could move. Forwarding was capped at five chats at a time, in India from July 2018 and worldwide from 21 January 2019. On 7 April 2020 messages already forwarded many times were cut to one chat at a time.
What happened. WhatsApp reported a 70% fall in highly forwarded messages within weeks of the April 2020 limit, and earlier a 25% fall in forwards over the two years after the 2018 cap. Both are company figures with no published method. Independent work by Melo and colleagues, modelling public-group data from Brazil, India and Indonesia, found the limits delay a campaign by orders of magnitude but do not stop content that is viral enough.
The catch. This counts forwards, not beliefs; nobody knows how many minds moved. It is also the only measure here that never judges what is true, which is why it survives inside an encrypted network — and why it slows a true message at exactly the same rate as a false one. In the Reuters Institute's 2026 survey Brazil was the only one of 48 markets where worry about false information fell, by 3 points.
WhatsApp figures as reported 27 April 2020; Melo and colleagues, 'Can WhatsApp Counter Misinformation by Limiting Message Forwarding?', 2019